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THIRD CIRCUIT CONFUSION: NCAA 
V. CHRISTIE AND AN 




The Framers of the United States Constitution envisioned a 
system of dual-sovereignty,1 where the state and federal governments 
would be independent of one another, constantly competing for 
power.2 The Framers believed this system would lead to state and 
federal governments that were both diverse and sensitive to their 
citizens’ needs, increase democratic participation, and also encourage 
innovation and experimentation in forms and methods of 
governance.3 The very structure of the Constitution reflects this 
principle of dual sovereignty,4 and the Framers further cemented it 
into American law with the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.5 
The anti-commandeering doctrine has been the Supreme Court’s 
weapon of choice when seeking to enforce the Tenth Amendment’s 
prohibition against conscripting state legislatures and officials and 
obliging them to carry out federal policies.6 The Supreme Court, 
however, has only used this doctrine to declare an act of Congress 
unconstitutional twice in its history.7 NCAA v. Christie provides the 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2019. 
 1.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). 
 2.  Id. at 458. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 457 (“As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual 
sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.”). 
 5.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 146 (1992). 
 7.  See Printz, 521 U.S. at 900 (holding that the federal government cannot force a state to 
administer federal programs and regulations); New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that the 
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Supreme Court with an opportunity to do so again and maintain the 
balance between state and federal power that the Framers enshrined 
in the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court should declare the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”)—as interpreted by both the federal 
government and the Third Circuit—unconstitutional for two reasons. 
First, PASPA violates the anti-commandeering doctrine endorsed by 
the Supreme Court by preventing individual states from modifying or 
repealing their state laws, effectively forcing them to implement 
federal policies. Second, PASPA frustrates the aims of federalism by 
restricting state legislatures’ ability to experiment with novel 
legislation and negates the political accountability that the Tenth 
Amendment is meant to ensure. 
I. FACTS 
PASPA’s key provision provides that neither states nor individuals 
may 
[S]ponsor, operate, advertise, or promote . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, 
or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based directly or 
indirectly (through the use of geographical references or 
otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur 
or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, 
or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games.8 
PAPSA’s prohibition on private persons is limited to gambling 
that is conducted “pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental 
entity.”9 States, on the other hand, are subject to an additional 
restriction under PASPA that forbids them from licensing or 
authorizing by “law or compact” any gambling activities related to 
amateur or professional athletes.10 
There were several exceptions to PASPA’s broad prohibition 
against gambling.11 State-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and 
sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware were exempted from 
PASPA’s regulation.12 Additionally, New Jersey was given a one year 
 
federal government cannot force a state to administer federal programs and regulations). 
 8.  28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012). 
 9.  28 U.S.C. § 3702(2). 
 10.  28 U.S.C. §§ 3702(1), 3701. 
 11.  28 U.S.C. § 3704(a). 
 12.  Id. (These states were allowed to continue sponsoring sports wagering due to their 
already extended history of doing so). 
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window in which to set up a sports gambling system which would then 
be exempt from PASPA’s prohibition.13 When PASPA was enacted in 
1992, New Jersey’s constitution and state laws forbade sports 
gambling, and the state did not legalize the activity within the granted 
one year window.14 
New Jersey has been seeking to legalize sports gambling and other 
forms of gambling since 2010 when they began assessing the public’s 
desire to change the New Jersey constitution to permit legalized 
sports gambling.15 In 2011, an amendment was proposed and 
successfully adopted into the New Jersey Constitution that allowed 
the state legislature to legalize sports wagering in casinos and at 
racetracks in Atlantic City.16 In 2012, the New Jersey state legislature 
passed the Sports Wagering Act (“SWA”) to bring this constitutional 
amendment to life.17 The SWA allowed for sports wagering at casinos 
and racetracks across New Jersey.18 Five sports leagues19 quickly filed 
suit against the parties responsible for enforcing the SWA in New 
Jersey (“The New Jersey Parties”), claiming that the SWA violated 
PASPA and seeking to enjoin the state statute from being 
implemented.20 The New Jersey Parties freely admitted that the SWA 
violated PASPA, but claimed that PASPA was unconstitutional 
because it violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.21 The New 
Jersey District Court found PASPA constitutional,22 and the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its decision.23 The court of appeals 
held that PASPA did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine 
because it merely prohibited states from affirmatively authorizing 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See N.J. CONST. Art. IV § VII ¶ 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:37-2 (West 2017); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:40-1 (West 2017). 
 15.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 16.  N.J. CONST. Art. IV, § VII, ¶2(D) 
 17.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 393. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  The five sports leagues were the National Collegiate Athletic Association, National 
Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and the Office of 
the Commissioner of Baseball, doing business as Major League Baseball. Id. at 393 n.1. 
 20.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 393. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 579 (D.N.J. 2013) 
(“After careful consideration of the Parties’ submissions, the Court has determined that PASPA 
is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ powers . . . .”). 
 23.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 240 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“Having examined the difficult legal issues raised by the parties, we hold that nothing in 
PASPA violates the U.S. Constitution.”). 
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sports wagering by law, and states could still repeal their existing anti-
gambling laws.24 
In 2014, the New Jersey state legislature tried legalizing gambling 
once again with the passage of SB 2460.25 SB 2460 did not purport to 
legalize gambling, but rather to merely repeal any existing 
prohibitions on sports betting as they applied to New Jersey casinos 
and racetracks in apparent compliance with the Third Circuits’ 
previous ruling.26 SB 2460 left in place existing prohibitions forbidding 
betting on New Jersey college team competitions and any collegiate 
competition that occurred in New Jersey.27 The law additionally 
prohibited sports betting at the newly deregulated casinos and 
racetracks for individuals younger than 21 years of age.28 
The same five sports leagues that sued to enjoin the SWA in 2012 
sued to enjoin the New Jersey Parties from giving effect to SB 2460.29 
The District Court ruled in favor of the sports leagues, and the Third 
Circuit affirmed their decision.30 On June 27, 2017, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.31 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Although the Supreme Court has only struck down acts of 
Congress as violations of the anti-commandeering doctrine twice in its 
long history,32 the doctrine itself has deep roots in American 
jurisprudence.33 Functionally, the anti-commandeering doctrine 
prevents the federal government from using state legislatures and 
officials as mere tools for the implementation of federal policies and 
regulations.34 Congress can provide incentives to states to try to 
encourage them to assist the federal government in enforcing 
regulations and policies, but Congress cannot coerce the states into 
 
 24.  Brief for Petitioner at 3, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, NO. 16-476 (U.S. 
June 27, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 25.  N.J. STAT. ANN. §5:12A-7 (West 2017). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 394 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, NO. 16-476 (U.S. June 27, 2017). 
 32.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 146 (1992). 
 33.  See New York, 505 U.S. at 161–66 (summarizing the historical background of the anti-
commandeering doctrine). 
 34.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a 
federal regulatory program.”). 
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providing that assistance; such coercion would violate the Tenth 
Amendment and run afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine.35 The 
Supreme Court has addressed the problem of anti-commandeering 
separately for the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of state 
governments. 
The Supreme Court first dealt with the commandeering of state 
judicial branches in Testa v. Katt.36 At issue in Testa was the federal 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which allowed any person who 
bought goods for more than the prescribed ceiling price to sue the 
seller in any court of competent jurisdiction, state or federal.37 Testa 
successfully sued Katt in Rhode Island state court for selling him a car 
in excess of the price ceiling.38 On appeal, the Rhode Island State 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that state courts need not enforce 
the penal laws of the federal government.39 The U.S. Supreme Court 
disagreed and ultimately held that the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution binds state courts to hear cases that Congress gives them 
jurisdiction over if comparable claims under state law would be heard 
in the same venue. This has effectively allowed Congress to 
commandeer state judicial branches to enforce federal regulations 
and policies.40 
The same cannot be said of state executive branches. In Printz v. 
United States,41 the federal government attempted to use states as an 
instrument to enforce federal policy, an attempt that the Supreme 
Court ultimately found to be unconstitutional.42 The federal statute at 
issue in Printz was the Brady Act, which established national instant 
background checks for all handgun sales.43 While the background 
check system was being developed and implemented, the Brady Act 
required local chief law enforcement officers (“CLEOs”) to perform 
the background checks themselves.44 Several of these CLEOs filed 
suit against the federal government, saying that forcing them to 
implement background checks to effectuate a federal law was an 
 
 35.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 36.  330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
 37.  Id. at 387. 
 38.  Id. at 388. 
 39.  Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312, 314 (R.I. 1946). 
 40.  Testa, 330 U.S. at 392–94. 
 41.  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 42.  Id. at 935. 
 43.  Id. at 898. 
 44.  Id. 
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unconstitutional commandeering of state executive branches.45 The 
District Courts of both Montana and Arizona agreed that the 
background check requirements for the CLEOs were 
unconstitutional, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
finding the entirety of the Brady Act constitutional.46 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and ultimately held that the federal 
government cannot command executive branch officials to administer 
or enforce federal regulatory programs.47 
Finally, in New York v. United States,48 the Supreme Court 
grappled with whether the federal government could “commandeer 
the States’ legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact 
and enforce a federal regulatory program.”49 At issue in New York was 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 
which was an attempt by the federal government to get states to 
provide for the disposal of waste created inside their borders.50 The 
Act provided monetary incentives for the states to create waste 
disposal plans and provided access incentives in the form of disposal 
facility access to the states that met their Act imposed deadlines.51 The 
Act also imposed a “take title” requirement on any state that did not 
legislate to create a waste disposal plan.52 This requirement forced 
states to take title to and possession of any waste created by a waste 
generator as well as paying those generators any and all damages 
caused by the state’s failure to take possession.53 
When a waste generator attempted to enforce the take title 
requirement against New York, the state filed suit, arguing it was 
unconstitutional to force states to either legislate as the federal 
government desired or be severely penalized by the take title 
requirement of the Act.54 The New York District Court dismissed the 
state’s case, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed their 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 935 (“The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States 
to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . [S]uch commands are 
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”). 
 48.  505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 49.  Id. at 145. 
 50.  Id. at 144. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
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decision.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that 
although the incentives provided in the Act were constitutional, the 
take title requirement was not.56 The Court reasoned that the take 
title requirement intruded into the state sovereignty protected by the 
Tenth Amendment by offering “two unconstitutionally coercive 
alternatives—either accepting ownership of waste or regulating 
according to Congress’ instructions.”57 The Court ruled that Congress 
could not “commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by 
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program.”58 
Printz, decided in 1997, was the last time the Supreme Court struck 
down an Act of Congress for violating the anti-commandeering 
doctrine.59 The doctrine has never been overruled, and Testa, Printz, 
and New York are still controlling law when determining whether 
Congress has unconstitutionally commandeered a branch of state 
government.60 
III.  HOLDING 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court of 
New Jersey’s ruling that PASPA did not unconstitutionally 
commandeer the New Jersey state legislature.61 The court focused on 
the fact that New Jersey’s “selective repeal” of its anti-wagering 
regulations did in fact violate PASPA because it amounted to an 
authorization of said wagering “by selectively dictating where sports 
gambling may occur, who may place bets in such gambling, and which 
athletic contests are permissible subjects for such gambling.”62 The 
court also held that PASPA does not run afoul of the anti-
commandeering doctrine because it does not “command states to take 
affirmative actions, and it does not present a coercive binary choice.”63 
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 145. 
 57.  Id. at 146. 
 58.  Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., Inc., 452 U.S. 
264, 288 (1981)). 
 59.  Elbert Lin and Thomas M. Johnson Jr., Symposium: High Stakes for Federalism in 
Heavyweight Clash over the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 17, 2017, 2:44 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-high-stakes-federalism-heavyweight-clash-
anti-commandeering-doctrine/. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d at 402. 
 62.  Id. at 396. 
 63.  Id. at 401. 
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IV. ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner’s arguments primarily assert that PASPA violates the 
Tenth Amendment and the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine by 
requiring states to maintain laws they would otherwise repeal. 
Petitioner also argues that PASPA diminishes the accountability of 
the federal officials who are truly responsible for PASPA by forcing 
states to maintain the legislation that furthers PASPA’s policy goals. 
A. Does PASPA Violate the Tenth Amendment and the Court’s Anti-
Commandeering Doctrine? 
Petitioner argues that PASPA, as interpreted by the Third Circuit, 
violates the anti-commandeering doctrine.64 Congress cannot 
determine the content of states’ laws because the determination of 
those laws is an attribute of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth 
Amendment.65 PASPA, the Petitioner argues, does exactly that by 
forbidding New Jersey to make changes to its sports wagering laws.66 
New Jersey is effectively forced to govern as Congress wills when it 
comes to the matter of sports wagering, which violates the Tenth 
Amendment and the anti-commandeering doctrine.67 Petitioner also 
argues that PASPA is not saved from unconstitutionality by the Third 
Circuit’s assertion that the state need not take any affirmative action 
for two main reasons.68 First, forcing New Jersey to reinstate laws 
against sports wagering is affirmative action in and of itself,69 and 
second, because the affirmative action distinction makes no 
difference; preventing a state from repealing a law is functionally 
equivalent to forcing it to pass a new one.70 
Petitioner distinguishes PASPA from other legislation challenged 
for commandeering state branches but ultimately declared 
constitutional by the Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Association, Inc.71, F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi.72 Reno v. 
 
 64.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 21. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 22. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 24–25. 
 69.  Id. at 25. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  452 U.S. 264 (1981) (The Surface Mining Act is challenged by the state of Virginia for 
allegedly violating the Tenth Amendment and found to be a constitutional use of Congress’ 
commerce clause powers to preempt conflicting state regulation). 
 72.  Fed. Energy Regulation Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (The Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act is challenged by the state of Mississippi as a violation of the 
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Condon,73 and South Carolina v. Baker.74 Petitioner asserts that 
PASPA is neither a federally administered regulatory program states 
are choosing to defer to nor legislation regulating states as individuals 
as the Supreme Court found in these cases.75 PASPA cannot be opted 
out of by states as they could in F.E.R.C. and Hodel; states are 
required to maintain their state law prohibitions;76 and they are not 
being directly regulated themselves as they were in Reno and Baker, 
but rather they are being forced to regulate their own citizens in their 
sovereign capacities as states.77 
Respondent argues that, since PASPA does not compel states to 
take affirmative action and instead only prohibits them from 
authorizing sports wagering, it cannot be in violation of the anti-
commandeering doctrine.78 New Jersey can repeal all of their sports 
gambling prohibitions if they so choose; they simply cannot carry out 
a targeted repeal that funnels gambling to Atlantic City.79 Respondent 
asserts that the anti-commandeering doctrine only prohibits Congress 
from imposing affirmative duties on states that force them to do 
Congress’s bidding and that Congress can withdraw powers from 
states via the Supremacy Clause at will.80 
B. Does PASPA Diminish the Accountability of State or Federal 
Elected Officials? 
Petitioner also argues that the Third Circuit’s interpretation of 
PASPA diminishes the accountability of state and federal elected 
officials.81 When state officials are unable to legislate as their citizens 
 
Tenth Amendment and found to not compel the exercise of state sovereign powers, but rather 
to simply establish requirements for state action if the state wished to remain involved in 
regulating an otherwise pre-emptible field). 
 73.  528 U.S. 141 (2000) (The Drivers Privacy Protection Act is challenged by the state of 
South Carolina as a violation of the Tenth Amendment and found to be constitutional because 
it does not require states to use their sovereign powers to regulate their own citizens, but rather 
regulates the states themselves). 
 74.  485 U.S. 505 (1988) (Section 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
is challenged by the state of South Carolina for violating the Tenth Amendment and found to be 
constitutional because it does not compel states to use their sovereign powers to enact and 
regulate a Congressional scheme, but rather directly regulates the states). 
 75.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 27–28. 
 76.  Id. at 27. 
 77.  Id. at 29. 
 78.  Brief for Respondent at 22, Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, NO. 
16-476 (U.S. June 27, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 25–26. 
 81.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 24, at 29. 
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wish them to because of federal regulation, it diminishes their 
accountability to the electorate.82 PASPA, as interpreted by the Third 
Circuit, prevents states from legislating freely and requires them to 
maintain unpopular state laws.83 Citizens will potentially hold state 
officials responsible for laws that the federal government is forcing 
upon them instead of the federal officials truly responsible.84 This 
method of legislating is bad for accountability because citizens are 
unable to easily determine who is responsible for what legislation.85 
Respondent argues in response that the federal government is 
clearly responsible for PASPA and that there is no diminished 
accountability for federal officials enforcing it.86 Respondent points 
out the statute operates by directly regulating states, as only a federal 
statute could, while also directly regulating the activities of private 
citizens.87 Respondent further argues that the states are not required 
to actively enforce PASPA and that federal officials do so, not state 
officials, so there can be no confusion about the prohibition against 
gambling being a federal regulation.88 Finally, Respondent points out 
that the four years of litigation between the state of New Jersey and 
the federal government over PASPA will have removed any 
remaining doubt that PASPA, and its prohibition against sports 
wagering, is a federal statute.89 
V. ANALYSIS 
PASPA, as interpreted by the Third Circuit, violates the anti-
commandeering doctrine. In 2014, the state of New Jersey repealed 
one of their own laws, passed by their own state legislature years 
prior. Remarkably, the federal government stepped in and told New 
Jersey that they could not repeal their own laws and commanded the 
state legislature to reinstate it. The federal government did not offer 
New Jersey funding if they chose to reinstate the law, nor did it inform 
New Jersey that the federal government would be enforcing the laws 
provisions as a federal matter. Instead, Congress told New Jersey they 
had to keep that particular law on the books. The Supreme Court held 
 
 82.  Id. at 30. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 31. 
 86.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 33. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 35. 
 89.  Id. 
BUCKHEIT FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 3/8/2018  2:03 PM 
2018] AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND FEDERALISM 143 
in New York that Congress cannot compel states to “regulate 
pursuant to Congress’s direction.”90 Dictating state laws either by 
forcing their enactment or forcing their continued existence amounts 
to functionally the same thing. Accordingly, PASPA’s restriction on 
states’ abilities to repeal their own laws, in part or in whole, cannot be 
constitutional in light of the anti-commandeering doctrine as laid out 
in New York.91 
A. PASPA Violates the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine. 
The anti-commandeering doctrine established in New York strictly 
prohibits Congress from commandeering state legislatures.92 In New 
York, Congress was not directly ordering the states to legislate in a 
particular way, but was instead threatening them with severe penalties 
if states did not do as Congress wished.93 The Court found this form of 
coercion to violate the anti-commandeering doctrine by not giving 
states a meaningful choice as to whether or not they wished to adopt 
legislation requested by the federal government.94 The mere fact that 
states did not have a meaningful choice between adopting or not 
adopting federal legislation was enough for the Court to find that 
Congress had overstepped its bounds, violated the Tenth Amendment, 
and infringed on state sovereignty.95 
To respect the precedent established in New York, PASPA must be 
found to violate the anti-commandeering doctrine. PASPA does not 
merely coerce states into passing certain laws—as interpreted by the 
Third Circuit, PASPA actually forbids a state from repealing their own 
laws should they so choose.96 There is no meaningful difference 
between forcing a state to pass a law and forcing them to retain one.97 
In both instances, the state’s legislative branch is being 
commandeered by Congress to advance Congressional policies and 
purposes. PASPA, by forbidding the repeal of state laws, has the same 
 
 90.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174 (1992). 
 91.  See id. at 188. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See id. at 175–76. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 188. 
 96.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 394 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 97.  See Brief for Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 4, 
Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, NO. 16-476 (U.S. June 27, 2017) (“Preventing the 
state from repealing an existing law is no different from forcing it to pass a new one; in either 
case, the state is being forced to regulate conduct that it prefers to leave unregulated.”) (quoting 
Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
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effect on state sovereignty that the Supreme Court decried as an 
unacceptable violation of the Tenth Amendment in New York in 
1992.98 When Congress tells a state legislature what laws it can and 
cannot repeal, Congress effectively takes control of that legislative 
branch and uses it as a tool for implementing federal policy, a practice 
the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional.99 At the heart of 
state sovereignty is the state’s power to repeal or create its own laws; 
therefore, this power must have been reserved to the states by the 
Tenth Amendment.100 Any invasion of that power is a violation of the 
Tenth Amendment and must be struck down by the Court. 
B. PASPA Frustrates the Aims of Federalism. 
By restricting the ability of states to repeal their own laws, PASPA 
frustrates the aims of federalism and nullifies the numerous benefits 
that can be derived from a system of dual sovereignty. These benefits 
include increased political accountability for officials and the 
potential for states to serve as laboratories of democracy.101 
The political accountability of state and federal officials is 
damaged by PASPA, as interpreted by the Third Circuit. Congress, via 
PASPA, is forcing New Jersey to help implement a federal prohibition 
against gambling while hiding its influence behind a screen of state 
laws it requires to remain in place. Practically, this means that when 
the citizens of New Jersey look for who is responsible for their 
inability to gamble, they will point the finger at state officials instead 
of where the blame really belongs—the federal government. This 
allows the federal government to achieve its objectives without fear of 
political repercussions.102 
PASPA also severely curtails the ability of the states to serve as 
laboratories of democracy. One of the main benefits of the separate 
federal and state systems is the ability to have states try out ideas on a 
smaller scale.103 For example, several states across the country are 
 
 98.  Id. at 2. 
 99.  New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
 100.  U.S. CONST. amend X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 101.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
 102.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 578, 578 (2012) (“[W]hen the State has 
no choice, the Federal Government can achieve its objectives without accountability.”) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 103.  Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311. 
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currently experimenting with marijuana legalization, despite its 
illegality at the federal level. These states provide a relatively low risk 
arena in which to judge the positive and negative effects of legalizing 
the drug. PASPA’s vice grip on the ability of New Jersey to legalize 
sports wagering denies New Jersey an opportunity to experiment with 
sports wagering legislation and to learn from its success or failure in a 
similar fashion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers established a dual system of government meant to 
protect state sovereignty from encroachment by a powerful federal 
government. The Tenth Amendment was the Framers’ solution, and 
the anti-commandeering doctrine is the Supreme Courts’ way of 
giving that amendment teeth in a world where state power is in 
decline. The doctrine, however, is not self-executing, and it is up to the 
Supreme Court to see that it is used to protect traditional areas of 
state sovereignty from federal invasion. Thus, the Supreme Court 
should use the anti-commandeering doctrine to prevent PASPA from 
infringing on the New Jersey legislature’s right to determine when to 
repeal their own state laws. 
 
